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1.

Introduction
Within the framework of assessing the risk of hypothetical hydrogen releases from hydrogen vehicles, various environments have to be considered, e.g. urban, tunnels, garage etc. One of these environments could be an underpass below a highway. A related accident involving a petrol tanker under a bridge happened in San Francisco, USA recently (San-Francisco [12] and according to the reporters the "huge leaping flames from the exploding gasoline tanker melted the steel underbelly of the highway overpass, causing it to collapse onto the roadway below virtually ensuring major traffic problems".
As to the authors' knowledge previous hydrogen safety related work on an underpass does not exist, but the previous work on tunnels is briefly reviewed given that there are strong similarities between an underpass and a tunnel. Earlier (and current) studies of hydrogen releases in tunnels include the work of Wilkening et al. [17] , Venetsanos et al. [13] , Middha and Hansen [9] , Kumar et al. [7] , Mukai et al. [11] and Baraldi et al. [2] .
Wilkening et al. [17] considered hydrogen releases from a compressed gaseous hydrogen (CGH2) and liquefied hydrogen (LH2) car within a 200 m tunnel of horseshoe cross section within the EIHP project (www.eihp.org). Later, Venetsanos et al. [13] used the same tunnel geometry and investigated hydrogen and natural gas releases from a CGH2 and compressed natural gas (CNG) bus within the EIHP-2 project (www.eihp.org). Inboth studies only one car or one bus was involved and no other vehicles were assumed to be present. Later, in the work performed within the HyTunnel internal project of HySafe NoE (www.hysafe.net) the previous studies were extended by considering the same tunnel cross section but assuming a rush hour with many vehicles present along the tunnel on both sides. The HyTunnel project also considered a tunnel with fíat roof and approximately the same cross sectional área in order to investígate the effect of the roof geometry.
What the above mentioned studies did not examine was the presence of various obstacles along the tunnel roof. Such obstacles can affect the dynamics of both hydrogen (and natural gas) dispersión and combustión and the extreme case is an underpass with beam and slab construction of the type considered in this paper. If the geometry is appropriate, flammable hydrogen can be trapped within the roof structures and remain there for a long time and thus increase the risk associated with an accidental reléase significantly. However, the ventilation in underpasses would typically be much better than in longer tunnels. In case of the flammable mixture being ignited the presence of obstacles could enhance acceleration and turbulence production, parameters which can both lead to a transition to a fast deflagration or DDT (deflagration to detonation transition).
Within the above framework, the focus of the present work was two-fold: to investígate the effects of the roof obstructions and at the same time to examine the variation between different partners' predictions.
SBEP-V11 specifications
The situation considered is a hydrogen reléase from a stationary bus in an underpass (see Fig. 1 ). Ambient conditions are quiescent with 15 °C temperature and 1 bar pressure.
No other vehicles are assumed to be present except for the hydrogen bus. It is assumed that the bus remains upright after the incident (and at the same position). The underpass is assumed to be of the common beam and slab type and construction with I-beams spanning across the highway. The underpass has a span of 15 m (X) length of 42 m (Y) and height 6 m (Z) (to the underside of bridge deck). There are 0.8 m (Z-depth) I-beams at 3 m centres in Y direction (1 cm Y-thick web with 50 cm Y-ends) (in red, see Fig. 1 ). Each I-beam has stiffeners on both sides of the web at the cross bracing positions and mid-way between the braces (in blue). There are also 0.3 m deep cross bracings between the beams at supports, mid-span, and quarter-span (in blue). The bus is assumed equipped with an eight cylinder storage system at 35 MPa (two banks of four interconnected cylinders) as in Venetsanos et al. [13] containing in total 40 kg of hydrogen. Each cylinder is equipped with two pressure relief devices (PRDs) according to regulations. The PRD nozzle diameter is assumed to be 4 mm. Each group of four neighbouring PRDs are vented into a 20 mm vent line. There are in total four such outlet vent lines.
Four scenarios were examined in total, the base case and three sensitivity tests.
• In the base case scenario the underpass geometry (basic geometry) is as described above. For this scenario it is applied by UPM and GexCon. JRC followed a different approach as explained in section 3.2 below, but which led to practically the same mass flow rate curve as with the other partners. The hydrogen concentrations (v/v) are reported in this SBEP at 10 monitor points (sensors) located every 4 m along the Y direction starting at X = 7.5 m, Z = 5.8 m and Y= 3 m. Also reported (optional) were the flammable volume and the equivalent stoichiometric cloud volume Q9 = XX V x u bi x E)/(U b i x E) stoich [9] as a function of time. Here, V is the flammable volume, U b i is the laminar buming velocity (corrected for flame wrinkling/Lewis number effects), E is volume expansión caused by buming at constant pressure in air, and the summation is over all control volumes. Thus, Q9 cloud is a scaling of the non-homogeneous gas cloud to a smaller stoichiometric gas cloud with scaling parameters the expansión and the reactivity. . All other parameters were as in the base case.
• For Sensitivity Test 3 it was assumed that only one PRD was activated so only 5 kg of hydrogen (1 tank) were released. All other parameters were as in the base case.
The leak rate was calculated by NCSRD using the GAJET integral code, as shown in Fig. 2 . The calculation was performed for 1 cylinder (5 kg hydrogen) with 4 mm nozzle, real gas hydrogen properties and discharge coefficient 0.8. The rate was multiplied by 4 (effective nozzle diameter 8 mm) in case of the 4 cylinders reléase. The leak rate calculated by NCSRD was also 3 .
Modelling strategy
The modelling options used by each partner are summarized in Tables 1 and 2 . Details for each partner are given below.
GexCon
GexCon has used the FLACS code. Earlier validation work for hydrogen dispersión is summarized in Middha et al. [10] . FLACS uses a standard fe-e model for turbulence. Some modifications are however implemented [1, 6] . These are, for example (a) the model for generation of turbulence behind sub-grid objects, (b) the model for the build-up of proper turbulence behind objects of a particular size for which the discretization produce too little turbulence, (c) the turbulent wall functions, (d) the buoyancy generated turbulence and (e) the initial turbulence/ inflow field calculated from Pasquill class. A structured Cartesian grid was used. The default grid resolution was 50 cm, and the grid was refined near the hydrogen reléase and near the ceiling as stratification was expected. The total number of cells ranged from about 240,000 to 340,000 depending on the reléase rate (one cylinder or four cylinder reléase) and the geometry (fíat or with beams). The Table 1 Partner 
JRC
JRC used the CFX 11 SPl code. Earlier related validatíon work using CFX can be found in [5, 16] . In the present calculations turbulence was modelled using the SST turbulence model of CFX with buoyancy terms for production and dissipation being activated. For both the convective and the temporal terms second order accurate schemes were applied. Around the underpass a large hemispherical volume (environment) was placed as outer boundary of the computational domain. A large size was chosen in order to reduce the effect of the boundary conditions on the simulations. The outer surfaces of the computational domain were defined mainly as walls and only the uppermost part of the domain was defined as outlet which allows only flow out of the domain. By these means the formation of an artificial flow through the underpass was avoided. The mesh created for the base case included 264264 nodes or 1298267 cells (tetrahedrons, prisms and pyramids).
The leak in the tank of the bus was calculated directly and not simulated by the Birch approach. A properly sized cylindrical volume (either representing four or one cylinders) was placed inside the bus combined with an outflow pipe of 8 mm (cross-section equivalent to four pipes of 4 mm diameter) or 4 mm diameter at the given leak position. The flow through the leak was then calculated from the time varying pressure difference between tank and flow domain starting from the given initial tank pressure. Real gas conditions according to the Redlich-Kwong EoS were applied. The tank in the bus was dimensioned to contain 20 or 5 kg hydrogen (35 MPa, 15 °C) at the beginning of the simulation.
Sufficiently small time steps together with a mesh refinement in the jet región were necessary to simúlate the under expanded jet released from the high pressure tank. The calculated máximum jet velocities downstream of the leak were in the order of 2700 m/s. The resulting high momentum in the jet improved the gas mixing in the underpass around the bus considerably. Consequently hydrogen concentrations at monitor positions as discussed in the following paragraphs are often lower and more uniform than obtained by the Birch approach of the other partners.
NCSRD
NCSRD has used the ADREA-HF code. Earlier validatíon work using ADREA-HF code has been summarized in Venetsanos et al. [14] . The numerical options used were the first order fully implicit scheme for time integration and the first order upwind scheme for the discretization of the convective terms. The increase of the time step was bounded by applying simultaneously two restrictions a máximum allowed time step of 0.1 seconds and a máximum convective CFL number of 2.
3.4.
UPM UPM has used the Fluent 6.2 code. Earlier validation using Fluent can be found in [4] and [15] . In the present simulations turbulence was modelled using the standard fe-e model. The SIMPLE method was employed and a third order MUSCL scheme was used for the convective scheme. A fixed time stepping method was used ranging from 0.01 to 0.1 s.
A structured hexahedral mesh was used. The number of cells was 660,000 for the base case and Sensitivity Cases 1 and 3. For Sensitivity Case 2 the grid is the same but without the upper part corresponding to z > 5 m, resulting in a mesh of 193,000 cells. The grid was refined near the H 2 reléase (the mínimum cell size was 1.5 cm).
4.
Results and discussion
As mentioned above the objectives of the SBEP were twofold: to examine the effect of the presence of the obstructions such as I-beams in the roof of the structure and to compare the variations between different partner predictions. In the discussion below the predictions obtained by different partners are compared first. One of the parameters used in assessing the risk of an accidental reléase is the flammable mixture volume, i.e. the volume of the hydrogen-air mixture, where hydrogen concentration is within the lower and upper flammability limits (4-75% respectively). The predicted flammable mixture volumes by each participant as a function of time are shown in Fig. 3 for the four cases considered (base plus three sensitivity cases). It can be observed that there are similarities but also significant differences in some cases between different predictions, especially 
Fig. 4 -Base case: predicted hydrogen concentration time histories at sensors (1-10) locations.
regarding the size of the máximum predicted flammable volume, the time of its occurrence as well as the behaviour of the flammable volume history at and beyond the end of the reléase. More specifically, for the base case and Sensitivity Tests 1 and 3, the UPM, NCSRD and JRC predictions show a similarity as they predict nearly the same flammable volume at large times, while the difference in predicted máximums is not so pronounced. On the other hand, GexCon predicts a different behaviour with small flammable volume valúes at large times for all the above cases and much higher máximum flammable volume for the base case and Sensitivity Test 1. For Sensitivity Test 2 on the other hand, despite the differences in predicted máximum flammable volume, it seems that there is general agreement in predicted behaviour between all four participants.
The above shows a general agreement between predictions when the underside of the bridge deck is fíat (Sensitivity Test 2), and deviations when the underside of the bridge deck includes the I-beams (base case, Sensitivity Tests 1 and 3). In the later case two different behaviours occur at large times: UPM, JRC and NCSRD predict large flammable hydrogen valúes near and after the end of the reléase while GexCon predicts flammable hydrogen disappearing. The above mentioned behaviour is re-examined below in the light of the predicted hydrogen concentration time histories at the selected sensor locations. Fig. 4 shows the predicted concentration time histories per partner for the base case scenario. For all partners the highest concentration is observed for sensor 5, located at Y= 19 m, which is the closest to the source. Next in magnitude are sensors 4 and 6 located south and north from the source at Y = 15 and Y=23m followed by sensors 3 and 7 and so on. The earlier mentioned similarity between NCSRD, JRC and UPM can also be observed here. The concentration valúes at large times are between 10 and 20% for NCSRD and UPM and down to 7% for JRC. On the other hand the corresponding concentrations as predicted by GexCon are less than the lower flammability limit of hydrogen (4%), which is consistent with the behaviour observed in Fig. 3 .
Predicted hydrogen concentration histories for Sensitivity Test 2 (flat roof at Z = 5 m) are presented in Fig. 7 below to be compared with Fig. 4 for the base case. It can be observed that the concentrations predicted by all the partners are of similar levéis, which is consistent with the similarity observed for the predicted flammable volumes in Fig. 3 . It can also be observed that concentration levéis are lower than for the base case due to hydrogen accumulation effects within the I-beams. The lower level of concentrations predicted by GexCon in Fig. 4 compared to the other partners can be attributed to higher levéis of turbulent mixing. This is shown in Fig. 5 , which presents the predicted turbulent kinetic energy field for each partner on the XZ plañe through the source at time 40 s. This increased turbulent mixing for GexCon is responsible both for the larger máximum flammable volume and for the much lower flammable volume at large times. Increased mixing leads in general to an increased cloud size but with lower concentrations. So increased mixing in a región of high concentrations can lead to an increase in the volume of the flammable cloud if the concentrations do not drop below the lower flammability limit, while increased mixing in a región of low concentrations can lead to the disappearance of the flammable cloud if concentrations drop below the LFL. A comparison of the predicted concentration field for each partner on the XZ plañe through the source at time 50 s is shown in Fig. 6 . It can be observed that the GexCon flammable cloud covers most of the underpass cross-section.
Regarding the source of this increased mixing for GexCon, it should be noted that the difference between GexCon and the other predictions occurs when the I-beams are present and not in case where the underside of the bridge deck is fíat (Sensitivity Test 2), so a logical explanation could be to attribute the above mentioned increased turbulence levéis to the modelling of the roof structures. Along this line, as mentioned in Section 3.1, GexCon uses a model for generation of turbulence behind sub-grid objects and a model for build-up of proper turbulence behind objects of a particular size for which the discretization produces too little turbulence. The effect of these models could be the reason for the above mentioned increased turbulence levéis.
It can also be seen from Fig. 4 that there is a sudden increase (kink) in the NCSRD concentration trace for sensor 5 at around 150 s and a nearly similar kink in the UPM concentration at approximately 60 s. It can also be observed that for NCSRD the concentrations at this location (nearest the source) become the lowest predicted concentrations at around 100 s. The low hydrogen concentration predicted cióse to the source (sensor 5) compared to sensors further away is not unreasonable, since the leak rate at 100 s is very low (0.02 kg/s) compared to the beginning of the leak (approx 0.9 kg/s). The increase in hydrogen concentration at sensor 5 is associated to hydrogen re-approaching the source after being transponed and accumulated far from it. The sudden increase could be associated with an obstacle effect, i.e. hydrogen suddenly passing over an obstacle (cross-bracings). The JRC prediction for sensor 5 shows an effect similar to NCSRD and UPM, but this effect is only seen at the very end of the outflow (around 170 s). Shortly before this time the concentration at sensor 5 drops below the concentrations at the neighbouring monitor locations. When the flow stops the trapped hydrogen mixes with the surroundings and the concentration at sensor 5 grows slowly. GexCon prediction does not show a similar phenomenon. The difference between partners' predictions regarding the above concentration increase could be attributed to the different turbulence modelling schemes used. More insight is needed on this special effect in the future.
The results of the performed sensitivity tests are reported below. Fig. 8 shows the predicted flammable volumes per partner. NCSRD and UPM predictions show a similarity. With the given roof obstructions (base case) the max flammable volume is decreased and a large flammable volume is preserved up to and beyond the end of reléase compared to Sensitivity Test 2. JRC predictions agree with NCSRD and UPM as far as the behaviour at large times. For the máximum flammable volume JRC predictions show that it remains practically unchanged. GexCon's prediction on the other hand shows a different behaviour. The máximum flammable volume is significantly increased with the I-beams and is reduced considerably after the end of reléase. This is associated with the increased mixing as mentioned above.
The very important effect of the I-beam structure compared to the fíat roof is presented in Fig. 9 which shows the predicted flammable mass histories. In the base case there is an increase of the máximum flammable mass with respect to the fíat roof (Sensitivity Test 2) by 57% according to NCSRD, 45% according to JRC and 105% according to GexCon, the absolute valúes being 13.8, 11.3 and 12.8 kg, respectively. A similar and even more pronounced picture is presented in Fig. 10 which shows the equivalent stoichiometric cloud volume histories. With I-beams the máximum Q9 is increased from approximately 25-30 m 3 with flat roof to 240 m 3 (NCSRD) and 120 m 3 (GexCon). The effect of hitting the light armature was investigated in Sensitivity Test 1. Fig. 8 shows that both GexCon and UPM predict lower flammable volume in this case as compared to the base case. NCSRD on the other hand did not see any important difference. Regarding the effect of releasing the contents of only one cylinder instead of four (5 kg instead of 20 kg) in the initial geometry, Fig. 8 shows that the flammable volumes are lower in all cases as expected.
Conclusions
Within the framework ofHySafe NoE, co-fundedby the EC, four HySafe partners performed CFD flow and dispersión calculations for benchmark SBEP-V11 with four different CFD codes, ADREA-HF, CFX, FLACS and FLUENT to simúlate a hydrogen reléase from a bus in an underpass. The underpass is assumed to be of the commonbeam and slab type and construction with I-beams spanning across the highway at 3 m centres plus cross bracing and light armatures creating cavities where hydrogen could potentially accumulate. Four scenarios were examined in total. For the base case the reléase was vertically upwards from one outlet fed from four cylinders containingin total 20 kg of hydrogen at 35 MPa. In Sensitivity Test 1 the source was horizontally moved so that the vertical hydrogen jet hit the light armature beforereaching the roof. In Sensitivity Test 2 the underside of the bridge deck was entirely flat. In Sensitivity Test 3 only 5 kg of hydrogen were released instead of 20 kg in the base case geometry. The performed simulations led to the following conclusions:
• Comparison between partners' predictions for the flammable volume history showed that there is general agreement when the underside of the bridge deck is flat (Sensitivity Test 2) and deviations when the I-beams are included (base case, Sensitivity Tests 1 and 3). In the later cases two different behaviours were observed at large times: NCSRD, JRC and UPM predict large flammable hydrogen valúes near and after the end of the reléase while GexCon predicts flammable hydrogen disappearing. The behaviour as predicted by GexCon was attributed to larger turbulent mixing, caused by the modelling of additional turbulence behind obstacles of a particular size.
• The presence of the I-beams leads to higher hydrogen concentrations, due to hydrogen-air cloud accumulation within the cavities. This was confirmed by all participating partners. Flammable volume behaviour on the other hand was found to have different trends. NCSRD and UPM found a lower máximum flammable volume with I-beams and large valúes persisting near and after the end of the reléase, while GexCon calculated a higher máximum and valúes falling to zero after the end of the reléase. For JRC the máximum was not affected by the presence of the beams, but the behaviour at large times was similar to UPM and NCSRD. The máximum appears early in the transient; at that time hydrogen is still concentrated in the jet región. According to the JRC simulation the mixing is dominated by the momentum of the jet and therefore the presence of Ibeams is not important for the máximum size of the flammable cloud.
• The effect of the I-beam structure compared to the flat roof was found to be very important. In the base case there is an increase of the máximum flammable mass with respect to the flat roof (Sensitivity Test 2) by 57% according to NCSRD, 45% according to JRC and 105% according to GexCon, the absolute valúes being 13.8, 11.3 and 12.8 kg, respectively. Additionally with I-beams the max Q9 are increased from approximately 25-30 m 3 (both NCSRD and GexCon) with flat roof to 240 m 3 (NCSRD) and 120 m 3 (GexCon).
• The change in the reléase position such that the jet hits the light armature (Sensitivity Test 1) leads to decreased flammable volumes according to GexCon and UPM, while the effect was negligible for NCSRD.
• As expected the reduction of released mass wherein the contents of only one cylinder instead of four (5 kg instead of 20 kg) were emptied in the base geometry (Sensitivity Test 3), led to significantly lower flammable volumes in the simulations of all partners.
• Finally, the variation between the different models clearly demonstrates the need to further valídate CFD models for the observed phenomena by conducting experiments representative of the environment and range of conditions examined within this study.
